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Abstract
This paper applies the theories of exposure order effects, developed in the psychology
literature, to an industrial organization model to explore their role in advertising compe-
tition. There are two firms and infinitely many identical consumers. The firms produce a
homogeneous product and distribute their brands through a common retailer. Consumers
randomly arrive at the retailer and buy their most preferred brands. The order in which a
consumer sees the advertising messages affects his brand preferences. Under the primacy
effect the consumer prefers the brand he first saw advertised, under the recency – the last
encountered brand. The equilibrium of the advertising game is characterized separately
under the primacy and the recency effects. In the first setting all consumers are initially
unaware of the product existence. The equilibrium advertising intensities, remarkably, do
not depend on the type of exposure order effect. In the other two settings some consumers
have already formed their brand preferences. The primacy and the recency effects give
rise to different equilibrium outcomes.
JEL Classifications: C73, D11, D43, L13, M37.
Keywords: advertising order effects, primacy, recency.
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I Introduction
Traditionally, advertising has been studied by two very different subfields of social science,
economics and psychology.1 The economic literature on advertising has been concerned with
such important questions as the informational content of ads, the socially optimal level of
advertising, and firm rivalry. The psychology literature, among other things, has explored
the connection between information processing and advertising effectiveness. The goal of this
paper is to develop a model that incorporates economics and psychology to examine how
information processing biases affect advertising competition between firms.
Past research in psychology has shown that the order in which consumers are exposed to
brands influence consumer preferences. Two advertising order effects have received attention.
The primacy effect is characterized by greater persuasion consequence of the first advertising
message. On the other hand, the recency effect occurs when the last encountered brand is
preferred. Whether exposure order results in the primacy effect or in the recency, depends
on different factors, such as overall involvement, motivation, attitude strength, and the time
between information exposure and preference construction.
Lana (1963) showed that subjects greatly interested in the topic exhibited the primacy
effect, whereas subjects with minimal interest exhibited the recency effect. The primacy effect
occurs when participants are motivated to elaborate the initial message and show critical
thinking toward later information, whereas the recency effect occurs when motivation is low
(Haugtvedt and Wegner 1994). Brunel and Nelson (2003) examined how advertising order
effects connect to gender differences. Their results suggested that under conditions of low
involvement, females exhibited the primacy effect, males – the recency effect. Under conditions
of higher involvement, females continued to exhibit the primacy effect, the recency effect
with male disappeared when the advertisement matched their values. Neidrich and Swain
(2007) found the primacy effect when the delay between attribute encoding and preference
construction is long (a few days). On the other hand, the recency effect is more likely to occur
when the delay is short (a few minutes).
1Of course, advertising is one of the primary subjects studied in the field of marketing. Most papers in mar-
keting concerning advertising, however, can be classified as having either economic or psychologic foundations.
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The model presented here applies the primacy and the recency effects to advertising com-
petition. The agents are two firms and infinitely many identical consumers of total mass
one. The firms produce a homogeneous product; firm A produces brand A and firm B pro-
duces brand B. The firms distribute their brands through a common retailer. Each consumer
randomly (according to a Poisson process) arrives at the retailer and buys his most preferred
brand. Consumers learn about the product existence and form their brand preferences through
the firms’ advertising. The order in which a consumer sees the advertising messages affects
his brand preferences. Under the primacy effect the consumer purchases the brand he first
saw advertised, whereas under the recency effect – whichever brand he most recently saw
advertised.
The firms compete in advertising intensities – the rate parameters of Poisson processes
that advertising messages follow. The equilibrium of the advertising game is characterized
separately under the primacy and the recency effects. Three setting are considered. In Setting
1 (New Market) consumers initially are unaware of the product existence. In this setup, the
equilibrium advertising intensities are symmetric and, remarkably, do not depend on the type
of exposure order effect.
In Setting 2 (Growing Market) it is assumed that at the beginning of the game a number
of consumers believe brand A is better, the equal number prefer brand B, and the rest are
unaware of the product existence. In this setup the two exposure order effects give rise
to different equilibrium outcomes. Results show that the firms choose higher advertising
intensities under the recency effect than under the primacy. In Setting 3 firm A has advantage
over firm B. Specifically, at the beginning of the game a number of consumers prefer brand A
and the rest are unaware of the product existence. Under the primacy effect the equilibrium
advertising intensities are symmetric, whereas under the recency effect firm B chooses higher
advertising intensity than firm A. Various welfare implications are investigated.
This paper contributes to the small but growing body of economic literature on advertis-
ing grounded in psychological research. Kra¨hmer (2004) developed a monopolistic model in
which the buyer may not recall correctly his past experience with the product. Advertising
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can activate memory and help consumers to recollect their past experiences, or distort actual
consumption experiences. Shapiro (2006) explored two alternative advertising mechanisms
that yield very different predictions. In the first, advertising converts memories of bad experi-
ences into memories of good ones. In the second, advertising makes favorable experiences more
likely to be remembered. Brekke and Rege (2007) captured availability heuristic phenomenon,
according to which consumers cannot distinguish between the recommendations or real people
and fictitious characters in advertisements. Their analysis showed that even if a person knows
that his observations of others may be distorted by advertising, it is still rational for him to
choose whichever product he has observed most often.
In the next section, the formal model is presented. The three settings are analyzed in
sections III through VI. Concluding remarks appear in Section VII. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
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II The Model
Firms and Consumers
Two firms, A and B, produce a homogeneous product using zero marginal cost technology.
The firms distribute their brands through a common retailer. The demand side consists
of infinitely many identical consumers of total mass 1. Consumers are risk-neutral, possess
continuous-time discount rate r > 0, and have a sequence of unit demands for the product.
In particular, a consumer receives a gross payoff of 1 whenever he arrives at the retailer and
buys his most preferred brand. The number of times the consumer visits the retailer follows
a homogenous Poisson process with rate parameter σ > 0. That is, in a small time interval
∆t the consumer visits the retailer with infinitesimal probability σ∆t+ o(∆t).2
Consumers learn about the product existence and form their brand preferences through
advertising. The number of ads describing brand A a consumer receives is a homogeneous
Poisson process with rate parameter αA, the number of ads describing brand B ads he receives
follows a Poisson process with rate parameter αB. It is assumed that consumers receive
advertising messages independently from each other (they watch/ listen to different TV/
radio programs at different times).
Advertising intensities, αA and αB, are chosen by the firms. The discounted cost needed
to achieve intensity α ≥ 0 is c(α)/r. Function c(·) is convex and increasing, c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0.
The standard boundary assumptions, c(0) = c′(0) = 0 and limα→∞ c′(α) =∞, guarantee the
existence of an interior solution.
Advertising Order Effects
The order in which a consumer sees the advertising messages affects his brand preferences.
Two main effects are considered: primacy and recency. The primacy effect is characterized
by greater persuasion consequence of the first advertisement. In the context of the present
2Formally, let Nt denote the number of times a consumer visits the retailer by time t. Nt is a Poisson process
with rate parameter σ > 0 if and only if (i) the number of visits during one time interval is independent of the
number of visits during a different non-overlapping time interval; (ii) in a small time interval ∆t the consumer
visits the retailer with probability Pr{Nt+∆t = Nt + 1} = σ∆t + o(∆t), and he visits the retailer more than
one time with probability o(∆t). On Poisson processes see, for example, Doob (1953).
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model, the primacy effect implies that the consumer purchases whichever brand he first saw
advertised. The recency effect, on the other hand, occurs when the last encountered brand is
preferred. That is, the consumer buys whichever brand he most recently saw advertised.
Let xA(t) denote the number of consumers that at time t believe brand A is better. Sim-
ilarly, xB(t) is the number of consumers that prefer brand B. The rest of the consumers,
x∅(t) = 1 − xA(t) − xB(t), are unaware of the product existence. These consumers will be
referred to as “ignorant” consumers, for the lack of a better term. How do xA(t), xB(t), and
x∅(t) evolve under the primacy and the recency effects given advertising intensities αA and
αB?
Consider the primacy effect. The probability that a consumer sees firm A’s advertisement
in a small time interval ∆t is αA∆t + o(∆t). Hence, the number of ignorant consumers who
see firm A’s ad is
αAx∅(t)∆t+ o(∆t).
Similarly, the number of ignorant consumers who see firm B’s ad is
αBx∅(t)∆t+ o(∆t).
Therefore, xA(t) increases at instantaneous rate αAx∅(t), xB(t) increases at rate αBx∅(t),
and the number of ignorant consumers decreases at rate (αA + αB)x∅(t). Algebraically,
d
dtx∅(t) = −(αA + αB)x∅(t),
d
dtxA(t) = αAx∅(t),
d
dtxB(t) = αBx∅(t).
(1)
The recency effect differs from the primacy effect in that consumers switch from one brand
to the other when they see an advertisement for the latter. Thus, the number of consumers
who switch from brand A to brand B is
αBxA(t)∆t+ o(∆t).
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Similarly, the number of consumers who switch from brand B to brand A is
αAxB(t)∆t+ o(∆t).
Therefore, xA(t) increases at rate αA(x∅(t) + xB(t)) and decreases at rate αBxA(t), xB(t)
increases at rate αB(x∅(t) + xA(t)) and decreases at rate αAxB(t). Algebraically,
d
dtx∅(t) = −(αA + αB)x∅(t),
d
dtxA(t) = αA(x∅(t) + xB(t))− αBxA(t),
d
dtxB(t) = αB(x∅(t) + xA(t))− αAxB(t).
(2)
The transition matrices (infinitesimal generators) for the primacy and the recency effects
are, respectively,
P =

−(αA + αB) 0 0
αA 0 0
αB 0 0

and
R =

−(αA + αB) 0 0
αA −αB αA
αB αB −αA
 .
Note that the column sums of P and R are equal to zero, the nondiagonal entries are nonneg-
ative, and the diagonal entries are nonpositive. Let
x¯(t) =

x∅(t)
xA(t)
xB(t)
 .
Then the systems of differential equations (1) and (2) can be rewritten in a matrix form,
d
dt
x¯(t) = Px¯(t)
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and
d
dt
x¯(t) = Rx¯(t).
The solutions are given by
x¯(t) = etP x¯(0) (3)
and
x¯(t) = etRx¯(0), (4)
where x¯(0) is the vector of initial conditions.3
Profit Functions of the Firms
The diagonalization4 is used to compute the exponentials etP and etR,
etP =

e−(αA+αB)t 0 0
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
1 0
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
0 1
 (5)
and
etR =

e−(αA+αB)t 0 0
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αA+αBe
−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αB+αAe
−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
 . (6)
Straightforward but tedious calculations are relegated to the Appendix. Substituting the above
expressions into (3) and (4) allows to compute x¯(t) under the primacy and the recency effects,
hence the number of consumers that prefer brand A, xA(t), and the number of consumers that
3The exponential etA is defined as
etA =
∞X
n=0
(tA)n
n!
.
4The first step is to diagonalize the matrix, A = QDQ−1, whereD = diag(d1, d2, . . .). Once A is diagonalized
it is easy to compute exponential etA,
etA =
∞X
n=0
Q(tD)nQ−1
n!
= Qdiag
“
ed1t, ed2t, . . .
”
Q−1.
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believe brand B is better, xB(t).
There is no price competition between the firms, as, by assumption, each consumer buys
whichever brand he believes is better. The firms set their prices equal to 1, consumer valuation
for the product. Hence, the profit functions of the firms are
ΠA(αA, αB) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtxA(t)σ dt− c(αA)
r
and
ΠB(αA, αB) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtxB(t)σ dt− c(αB)
r
.
Three Different Settings
The firms choose their advertising intensities αA and αB simultaneously at the beginning of
the game. The equilibrium concept employed is Nash equilibrium. Three different settings
are considered. In Setting 1 it is assumed that at time t = 0 consumers are unaware of the
product existence,
x¯(0) =

1
0
0
 .
In Setting 2, γ consumers are ignorant, (1 − γ)/2 believe brand A is better, and (1 − γ)/2
prefer brand B. That is,
x¯(0) =

γ
1
2(1− γ)
1
2(1− γ)
 .
In Setting 3 firm A has advantage over firm B. In particular, it is assumed that at the
beginning of the game γ consumers are unaware of the product existence, the rest believe
brand A is better,
x¯(0) =

γ
1− γ
0
 .
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In the next three sections each setting is analyzed separately under the primacy and the
recency effects.
III Setting 1 (New Market)
Consider the setting in which initially consumers are unaware of the product existence. Under
the primacy effect,
x¯(t) =

e−(αA+αB)t 0 0
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
1 0
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
0 1


1
0
0
 =

e−(αA+αB)t
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
 .
Hence,
xA(t) =
αA − αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA + αB
(7)
and
xB(t) =
αB − αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA + αB
. (8)
Observe that the first column of matrix (5) coincides with the first column of matrix (6).
Hence, functions xA(t) and xB(t) are the same under the recency effect as under the primacy.
This apparently surprising result can be easily explained. Indeed, the number of consumers
who switch from brand B to brand A in a small time interval ∆t is
αAxB(t)∆t+ o(∆t).
Similarly,
αBxA(t)∆t+ o(∆t)
consumers switch in the opposite direction – from brand A to brand B. It follows from (7)
and (8) that for any given αA and αB
αAxB(t) = αBxA(t)
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holds for all values of t. Therefore, consumer switching does not affect xA(t) and xB(t)
obtained under the primacy effect.
Substituting (7) and (8) into the firms’ profit functions and computing the integrals yield
ΠA(αA, αB) =
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αA)
r
and
ΠB(αA, αB) =
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αB)
r
.
Let α∗A and α
∗
B denote the advertising intensities chosen by the firms in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium in Setting 1). Under both the primacy and the recency effects
α∗A = α
∗
B = α
∗, where α∗ is implicitly defined by
σ (α∗ + r)
(2α∗ + r)2
= c′ (α∗) .
How do the equilibrium levels of advertising intensities compare with the social optimum?
The social welfare is given by
W (αA, αB) ≡
∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xA(t) + xB(t))σ dt− 1
r
(c(αA) + c(αB)).
In the present model it coincides with the sum of the firms’ profits. Hence, in Setting 1 the
social welfare equals
W (αA, αB) =
σ(αA + αB)
r(αA + αB + r)
− 1
r
(c(αA) + c(αB)).
Let α†A and α
†
B denote the socially optimal advertising intensities.
The next proposition shows that the firms over-advertise in equilibrium. Intuitively, each
firm cares only about the number of consumers that prefer its own brand. The social planner,
on the other hand, aims to increase the number of consumers that learn about the product
existence through the firms’ advertising messages, xA(t) + xB(t).
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Proposition 2 (Social Optimum in Setting 1). The socially optimal levels of advertising
intensities are α†A = α
†
B = α
†, where α† is implicitly defined by
σr
(2α† + r)2
= c′
(
α†
)
.
Advertising is socially excessive, α∗ > α†.
In the simple setting with x∅(0) = 1, the equilibrium outcome is the same under the
primacy and the recency effects. However, if at t = 0 a number of consumers have already
formed their preferences about the two brands, as in Setting 2, or if one of the firms has
competitive advantage, as in Setting 3, the two advertising order effects have different strategic
implications.
IV Setting 2 (Growing Market)
Consider the setting in which at the beginning of the game (1−γ)/2 consumers believe brand
A is better, (1− γ)/2 consumers prefer brand B, and the rest are ignorant consumers. Under
the primacy effect,
x¯(t) =

e−(αA+αB)t 0 0
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
1 0
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
0 1


γ
1
2(1− γ)
1
2(1− γ)
 .
Hence,
xPA(t) = γ
αA − αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA + αB
+
1
2
(1− γ) (9)
and
xPB(t) = γ
αB − αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA + αB
+
1
2
(1− γ). (10)
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(Superscript “P” stands for primacy.) Substituting (9) and (10) into the firms’ profit functions
and computing the integrals yield
ΠPA(αA, αB) = γ
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
+
1
2
(1− γ)σ
r
− c(αA)
r
(11)
and
ΠPB(αA, αB) = γ
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
+
1
2
(1− γ)σ
r
− c(αB)
r
. (12)
These formulas deserve some discussion. At the beginning of the game, (1− γ)/2 consumers
prefer brand A and – under the primacy effect – will never switch to brand B (they are “locked
up” by firm A). Firm A earns
1
2
(1− γ)σ
r
from these consumers. Similarly, (1− γ)/2 consumers are locked up by firm B. Firm B earns
1
2
(1− γ)σ
r
from these consumers. Finally, γ consumers are unaware of the product existence. If an
ignorant consumer first sees an ad describing brand A, he becomes firm A’s customer. If
the consumer first sees firm B’s ad, he becomes firm B’s customer. Firms A and B earn,
respectively,
γ
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
and
γ
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
from γ initially ignorant consumers.
In contrast to Setting 1, the recency effect in Setting 2 gives rise to a different vector x¯(t).5
5Recall that in Setting 1, αAxB(t) = αBxA(t) holds for any values of αA and αB . Here, αAx
P
B(t) = αBx
P
A(t)
holds only for αA = αB .
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The profits of the firms are given by
ΠRA(αA, αB) = γ
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
+
1
2
(1− γ)σ
r
+
1
2
(1− γ) σ(αA − αB)
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αA)
r
(13)
and
ΠRB(αA, αB) = γ
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
+
1
2
(1− γ)σ
r
+
1
2
(1− γ) σ(αB − αA)
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αB)
r
. (14)
(Superscript “R” stands for recency.) It follows that firm A’s profit function under the recency
effect (13) differs from that under the primacy effect (11) by
1
2
(1− γ) σ(αA − αB)
r(αA + αB + r)
. (15)
This term reflects consumer switching between the brands. It enters with negative sign firm
B’s profit function (14).
Let αP∗A and α
P∗
B denote the advertising intensities chosen by the firms in equilibrium
under the primacy effect. Similarly, let αR∗A and α
R∗
B denote the equilibrium intensities chosen
under the recency effect. Proposition 3 shows that the equilibrium advertising intensities are
higher under the recency effect. This result is driven by (15), which creates extra incentives
for the firms to advertise.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium in Setting 2).
(i) Under the primacy effect αP∗A = α
P∗
B = α
P∗, where αP∗ is implicitly defined by
γ
σ
(
αP∗ + r
)
(2αP∗ + r)2
= c′
(
αP∗
)
.
(ii) Under the recency effect αR∗A = α
R∗
B = α
R∗, where αR∗ is implicitly defined by
γ
σ
(
αR∗ + r
)
(2αR∗ + r)2
+
1
2
(1− γ) σ
2αR∗ + r
= c′
(
αR∗
)
.
(iii) There is more advertising under the recency effect, αR∗ > αP∗.
14
The social welfare is the same under the primacy and the recency effects,
W (αA, αB) = γ
σ(αA + αB)
r(αA + αB + r)
+ (1− γ)σ
r
− 1
r
(c(αA) + c(αB)).
Indeed, it does not matter for the social planner whether a consumer switches from one brand
to the other after he observes an advertising message for the latter (the recency effect), or
not (the primacy effect). The next proposition shows that the firms over-advertise under the
primacy effect, and, hence, under the recency effect.
Proposition 4 (Social Optimum in Setting 2). The socially optimal levels of advertising
intensities are α†A = α
†
B = α
†, where α† is implicitly defined by
γ
σr
(2α† + r)2
= c′(α†).
Advertising is socially excessive, αR∗ > αP∗ > α†.
V Setting 3 (One Firm Has Advantage)
Consider the setting in which at the beginning of the game γ consumers are ignorant and the
rest believe brand A is better. As in Setting 2, the primacy and the recency effects give rise
to different equilibrium outcomes. Under the primacy effect, the profit functions of the firms
are given by
ΠPA(αA, αB) = γ
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
+ (1− γ)σ
r
− c(αA)
r
(16)
and
ΠPB(αA, αB) = γ
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αB)
r
. (17)
Under the recency effect,
ΠRA(αA, αB) = γ
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
+ (1− γ) σ(αA + r)
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αA)
r
(18)
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and
ΠRB(αA, αB) =
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αB)
r
. (19)
Formulas (16) through (19) deserve some discussion. Consider γ initially ignorant consumers.
The profits that firm A and firm B earn from these consumers are the same under the recency
effect as under the primacy (the result obtained in Setting 1). In particular, firm A earns
γ
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
and firm B earns
γ
σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
.
Consider the rest of the consumers that at time t = 0 prefer brand A. These consumers are
locked up by firm A under the primacy effect, hence firm A earns
(1− γ)σ
r
(20)
and firm B earns 0. Under the recency effect firm A loses part of (20) to firm B. In particular,
firm A earns
(1− γ) σ(αA + r)
r(αA + αB + r)
and firm B earns
(1− γ) σαB
r(αA + αB + r)
.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium in Setting 3).
(i) Under the primacy effect αP∗A = α
P∗
B = α
P∗, where αP∗ is implicitly defined by
γ
σ
(
αP∗ + r
)
(2αP∗ + r)2
= c′
(
αP∗
)
.
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(ii) Under the recency effect αR∗A and α
R∗
B are implicitly defined by
σ(αR∗B +γr)
(αR∗A +αR∗B +r)
2 = c′
(
αR∗A
)
,
σ(αR∗A +r)
(αR∗A +αR∗B +r)
2 = c′
(
αR∗B
)
.
Also, αR∗A < α
R∗
B < α
R∗
A + (1− γ)r.
(iii) Firm B chooses higher advertising intensity under the recency effect than under the
primacy, αR∗B > α
P∗.
The first result of Proposition 5 is easily understood. Under the primacy effect (1 − γ)
consumers are locked up by firm A. Firm A and firm B are symmetric with respect to
γ initially ignorant customers, for which they compete. Hence, the firms choose the same
advertising intensities in equilibrium, αP∗A = α
P∗
B .
The result that firm B chooses higher advertising intensity than firm A under the recency
effect is also intuitive. At the beginning of the game, firm A’s advertising messages affect
only γ ignorant consumers, as the rest of the consumers already believe brand A is better.
Firm B’s messages, on the other hand, affect all consumers – ignorant as well as those who
initially preferred brand A. Thus, firm B’s incentives to advertise are stronger than firm A’s,
especially at the beginning. This results in αR∗B > α
R∗
A .
Finally, Proposition 5 shows that firm B chooses higher advertising intensity under the
recency effect than under the primacy, αR∗B > α
P∗
B = α
P∗. Firm A’s equilibrium advertising
intensities αR∗A and α
P∗
A = α
P∗, however, cannot be ranked, because Firm A’s best reply under
the recency effect is non-monotonic in αB.
The social welfare function in the current setting coincides with the one obtained in the
previous setting,
W (αA, αB) = γ
σ(αA + αB)
r(αA + αB + r)
+ (1− γ)σ
r
− 1
r
(c(αA) + c(αB)).
The next proposition shows that under the primacy effect both firms over-advertise, and,
hence, under the recency effect firm B over-advertises (α† and αR∗A cannot be ranked).
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Proposition 6 (Social Optimum in Setting 3). The socially optimal levels of advertising
intensities are α†A = α
†
B = α
†, where α† is implicitly defined by
γ
σr
(2α† + r)2
= c′
(
α†
)
.
Moreover, αR∗B > α
P∗ > α†.
VI Setting 2 versus Setting 3
The social welfare function is the same in Setting 2 and Setting 3. This makes comparison
between the equilibria in the two settings legitimate and, therefore, valuable.
Proposition 7 (Equilibrium in Setting 2 vs. Equilibrium in Setting 3).
(i) Under the primacy effect, the firms’ equilibrium advertising intensities in Setting 2 are the
same as in Setting 3,
αP∗A [S2] = α
P∗
B [S2] = α
P∗
A [S3] = α
P∗
B [S3] .
(ii) Under the recency effect, firm B’s equilibrium advertising intensity is higher in Setting 3
than in Setting 2,
αR∗B [S3] > α
R∗
B [S2] .
(The corresponding settings are specified in square brackets.) The first result of Proposition
7 follows directly from Proposition 3(i) and Proposition 5(i). Intuitively, in both settings under
the primacy effect the firms compete for γ initially ignorant consumers. Whether the rest of
the consumers are locked up by both firms, as in Setting 2, or by firm A, as in Setting 3, does
not change the competition between the firms. Hence, the equilibrium advertising intensities
in Setting 2 are the same as in Setting 3.
Next, consider the recency effect. In Setting 3 at the beginning of the game, firm B’s
advertising messages affect all consumers, γ ignorant and (1−γ) that prefer brand A. However,
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in Setting 2 firm B’s messages have actual effect only on γ + (1− γ)/2 consumers – ignorant
and those who initially preferred brand A. Thus, firm B’s incentives to advertise are stronger
in Setting 3. As a result, firm B chooses higher advertising intensity in Setting 3 than in
Setting 2.
VII Conclusion
This paper has applied the theories of exposure order effects, developed in psychology litera-
ture, to an industrial organization model to explore their role in advertising competition. The
equilibrium advertising intensities were characterized separately under the primacy and the
recency effects in three different settings. It was shown that in a new market (Setting 1) the
advertising equilibrium does not depend on the type of exposure order effect.
However, in a growing market where a number of consumers have already formed their
preferences about the two brands (Setting 2), or if one of the firms has more customers than
the other (Setting 3), the primacy and the recency effects give rise to different equilibrium
outcomes. Under the primacy effect the consumers that prefer a particular brand from the
outset will never switch to the other brand. The firms compete for initially ignorant consumers,
and, therefore, choose the same advertising intensities across both settings. Under the recency
effect, on the other hand, each firm’s advertising messages affect ignorant consumers as well as
those who prefer the rival brand. In Setting 2 the firms choose higher advertising intensities
under the recency effect than under the primacy. In Setting 3 firm B chooses higher advertising
intensity than firm A. It was also shown that in all three settings the firms over-advertise in
equilibrium.
One of the limitations of the present model is that the firms’ advertising intensities are
fixed throughout the game. A dynamic version of the advertising game, in which the firms
choose their advertising intensities continuously, does not have an analytical solution. This
is because the differential equations that describe the primacy and the recency effects are
not linear in the advertising intensities.6 Analyzing the static game under different initial
6On differential games see, for example, Zaccour (2002) and Erickson (2003).
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conditions, however, uncovers some features of the dynamic setup. The number of ignorant
consumers, γ, decreases with the passage of time. Therefore, under the primacy effect the
equilibrium advertising intensities gradually converge to zero. Under the recency effect the
firms advertise more at the beginning, but their equilibrium advertising intensities will always
be bounded away from zero.
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Appendix
Derivations of (5) and (6).
Consider matrix P . This matrix has eigenvalues 0, −(αA + αB), 0. Hence,
P = QP˜Q−1,
where
P˜ =

0 0 0
0 −(αA + αB) 0
0 0 0
 ,
Q =

0 1 0
αA
αA+αB
− αAαA+αB 1αA+αB
αB
αA+αB
− αBαA+αB − 1αA+αB
 , Q−1 =

1 1 1
1 0 0
0 αB −αA
 .
The columns of Q are right eigenvectors of P and the rows of Q−1 are left eigenvectors. The
eigenvectors are unique up to a multiplicative constant. The constant in the right eigenvector
for eigenvalue 1 is chosen so that it is the invariant probability distribution for P ,

0
αA
αA+αB
αB
αA+αB
 .
Next, consider matrix R. This matrix has eigenvalues 0, −(αA+αB), −(αA+αB). Hence,
R = QR˜Q−1,
where
R˜ =

0 0 0
0 −(αA + αB) 0
0 0 −(αA + αB)
 ,
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Q is the same as above.
Once P and R are diagonalized, it is easy to compute exponentials etP and etR,
etP =
∞∑
n=0
Q
(
tP˜
)n
Q−1
n!
= Q

1 0 0
0 e−(αA+αB)t 0
0 0 1
Q−1 =

e−(αA+αB)t 0 0
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
1 0
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
0 1

and
etR =
∞∑
n=0
Q
(
tR˜
)n
Q−1
n!
= Q

1 0 0
0 e−(αA+αB)t 0
0 0 e−(αA+αB)t
Q−1
=

e−(αA+αB)t 0 0
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αA+αBe
−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αA−αAe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αB−αBe−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
αB+αAe
−(αA+αB)t
αA+αB
 .
Proof of Proposition 1.
The profit function of firm i = A,B is
Πi(αA, αB) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtxi(t)σ dt− c(αi)
r
=
σαi
αA + αB
∫ ∞
0
(
e−rt − e−(αA+αB+r)t
)
dt− c(αi)
r
=
σαi
αA + αB
(
1
r
− 1
αA + αB + r
)
− c(αi)
r
=
σαA
r(αA + αB + r)
− c(αi)
r
.
Firm i’s best reply is implicitly defined by the first order condition for the profit maximization
problem,
∂
∂αi
Πi(αA, αB) =
σ(αj + r)
r(αA + αB + r)2
− c
′(αi)
r
= 0,
or
σ(αj + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αi),
i 6= j. Because
∂2
∂α2i
Πi(αA, αB) =
−2σ(αj + r)
r(αA + αB + r)3
− c
′′(αi)
r
< 0,
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the first order condition is sufficient.
Therefore, equilibrium advertising intensities satisfy

σ(α∗B+r)
(α∗A+α∗B+r)
2 = c′ (α∗A) ,
σ(α∗A+r)
(α∗A+α∗B+r)
2 = c′ (α∗B) .
The equilibrium is unique and symmetric. Indeed, it follows from above that
(α∗A + r) c
′ (α∗A) = (α
∗
B + r) c
′ (α∗B) .
Because (α + r)c′(α) is an increasing function of α, it must be the case that α∗A = α
∗
B = α
∗,
where α∗ satisfies
σ (α∗ + r)
(2α∗ + r)2
= c′ (α∗) . (21)
Next, observe that the left-hand-side of (21) is decreasing and the right-hand-side is increasing
in α∗. Hence, the solution is unique.
Proof of Proposition 2
The first order conditions for the social planner’s optimization problem are

σr“
α†A+α
†
B+r
”2 = c′ (α†A) ,
σr“
α†A+α
†
B+r
”2 = c′ (α†B) .
The matrix of second derivatives − 2σ(αA+αB+r)3 − c′′(αA)r − 2σ(αA+αB+r)3
− 2σ
(αA+αB+r)3
− 2σ
(αA+αB+r)3
− c′′(αB)r

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is negative semidefinite, which implies the sufficiency of the first-order conditions. By sym-
metry, α†A = α
†
B = α
†, where α† satisfies
σr
(2α† + r)2
= c′
(
α†
)
. (22)
It follows from (21), (22), and the convexity of c(α) that α∗ > α†.
Proof of Proposition 3
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Consider the primacy effect. Firm A’s best reply is given by the first order condition
γ
σ(αB + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αA),
firm B’s – by
γ
σ(αA + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αB),
As in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that the first-order conditions are
sufficient and that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric, αP∗A = α
P∗
B = α
P∗, where
αP∗ satisfies
γ
σ
(
αP∗ + r
)
(2αP∗ + r)2
= c′
(
αP∗
)
. (23)
(ii) Consider the recency effect. Firm A’s best reply is given by the first order condition
γ
σ(αB + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
+
1
2
(1− γ) σ(2αB + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αA),
firm B’s – by
γ
σ(αA + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
+
1
2
(1− γ) σ(2αA + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αB).
It is straightforward to show that the first-order conditions are sufficient and that the
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equilibrium is unique and symmetric, αR∗A = α
R∗
B = α
R∗, where αR∗ satisfies
γ
σ
(
αR∗ + r
)
(2αR∗ + r)2
+
1
2
(1− γ) σ
2αR∗ + r
= c′
(
αR∗
)
. (24)
(iii) It follows from (23), (24), and the convexity of c(α) that αR∗ > αP∗.
Proof of Proposition 4
The first order conditions for the social planner’s optimization problem are

γ σr“
α†A+α
†
B+r
”2 = c′ (α†A) ,
γ σr“
α†A+α
†
B+r
”2 = c′ (α†B) .
By symmetry, α†A = α
†
B = α
†, where α† satisfies
γ
σr
(2α† + r)2
= c′
(
α†
)
. (25)
It follows from (23), (24), (25), and the convexity of c(α) that αR∗ > αP∗ > α†.
Proof of Proposition 5
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Consider the primacy effect. Firm A’s best reply is given by the first order condition
γ
σ(αB + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αA),
firm B’s – by
γ
σ(αA + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αB),
The equilibrium is unique and symmetric, αP∗A = α
P∗
B = α
P∗, where αP∗ satisfies
γ
σ
(
αP∗ + r
)
(2αP∗ + r)2
= c′
(
αP∗
)
. (26)
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(ii) Consider the recency effect. Firm A’s best reply is given by the first order condition
γ
σ(αB + γr)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αA),
firm B’s – by
σ(αA + r)
(αA + αB + r)2
= c′(αB).
Therefore, αR∗A and α
R∗
B satisfy
σ(αR∗B +γr)
(αR∗A +αR∗B +r)
2 = c′
(
αR∗A
)
,
σ(αR∗A +r)
(αR∗A +αR∗B +r)
2 = c′
(
αR∗B
)
.
(27)
It is left to show that αR∗A < α
R∗
B < α
R∗
A + (1 − γ)r. By contrary, suppose αR∗A ≥ αR∗B .
Then c′
(
αR∗A
) ≥ c′ (αR∗B ). It follows from (27) that
σ
(
αR∗B + γr
)(
αR∗A + α
R∗
B + r
)2 ≥ σ
(
αR∗A + r
)(
αR∗A + α
R∗
B + r
)2 ,
or
αR∗B ≥ αR∗A + (1− γ)r.
This contradicts the supposition. Hence, αR∗A < α
R∗
B .
Next, suppose αR∗B ≥ αR∗A +(1−γ)r. Then c′
(
αR∗B
)
> c′
(
αR∗A
)
. It follows from (27) that
σ
(
αR∗A + r
)(
αR∗A + α
R∗
B + r
)2 > σ
(
αR∗B + γr
)(
αR∗A + α
R∗
B + r
)2 ,
or
αR∗B < α
R∗
A + (1− γ)r.
This contradicts the supposition. Hence, αR∗B < α
R∗
A + (1− γ)r.
(iii) By contrary, suppose αP∗ ≥ αR∗B . Then c′
(
αP∗
) ≥ c′ (αR∗B ). It follows from (26) and the
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second equation in (27) that
γ
σ
(
αP∗ + r
)
(2αP∗ + r)2
≥ σ
(
αR∗A + r
)(
αR∗A + α
R∗
B + r
)2 . (28)
The right-hand-side of the above inequality is greater than
σ
(
αR∗B + r
)(
2αR∗B + r
)2 .
Indeed,
σ
(
αR∗A + r
)(
αR∗A + α
R∗
B + r
)2 − σ
(
αR∗B + r
)(
2αR∗B + r
)2
can be rewritten as
σ
(
αR∗B − αR∗A
) (
αR∗B
(
αR∗A + r − αR∗B
)
+ r2 + αR∗A r
)(
αR∗A + α
R∗
B + r )2( 2α
R∗
B + r
)2 > 0.
Therefore, (28) implies
γ
σ
(
αP∗ + r
)
(2αP∗ + r)2
≥ σ
(
αR∗B + r
)(
2αR∗B + r
)2 .
Because (α+ r)/(2α+ r)2 is a decreasing function of α, it follows that αR∗B > α
P∗. This
contradicts the supposition. Hence, αR∗B > α
P∗.
Proof of Proposition 6
The result follows directly from Proposition 3(i), Proposition 4, and Proposition 5(i,iii).
Proof of Proposition 7
Each part is proven in turn.
(i) The result follows directly from Proposition 3(i) and Proposition 5(i).
(ii) By contrary, suppose αR∗B [S2] ≥ αR∗B [S3]. Then c′
(
αR∗B [S2]
) ≥ c′ (αR∗B [S3]). It follows
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from (24) and the second equation in (27) that
γ
σ
(
αR∗B [S2] + r
)(
2αR∗B [S2] + r
)2 + 12(1− γ) σ2αR∗B [S2] + r ≥ σ
(
αR∗A [S3] + r
)(
αR∗A [S3] + α
R∗
B [S3] + r
)2 . (29)
The right-hand-side of the above inequality is greater than
σ
(
αR∗B [S3] + r
)(
2αR∗B [S3] + r
)2 ,
as was shown in the proof of Proposition 5. Therefore, (29) implies
γ
σ
(
αR∗B [S2] + r
)(
2αR∗B [S2] + r
)2 + 12(1− γ) σ2αR∗B [S2] + r ≥ σ
(
αR∗B [S3] + r
)(
2αR∗B [S3] + r
)2 ,
or
σ
(
αR∗B [S2] + r
)(
2αR∗B [S2] + r
)2 − 12(1− γ) σr(2αR∗B [S2] + r)2 ≥
σ
(
αR∗B [S3] + r
)(
2αR∗B [S3] + r
)2 .
Because (α+r)/(2α+r)2 is a decreasing function of α, it follows that αR∗B [S3] > α
R∗
B [S2].
This contradicts the supposition. Hence, αR∗B [S3] > α
R∗
B [S2].
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